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Abstract
We provide novel evidence on the micro-structure of international trade dur-
ing the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession by exploring a rich
firm-level data set from Spain. The focus of our analysis is on changes at the
extensive and intensive firm-level margins of trade, as well as on performance
differences (jobs, productivity, and firm survival) across firms that differ in their
export status. We find no adverse effects of the financial crisis on foreign market
entry or exit, but a considerable increase in the export intensity of firms after
the financial crisis. Moreover, we find that exporters were more resilient to the
crisis than non-exporters. Finally, while exporters showed a significantly more
favorable development of total factor productivity after 2009 than non-exporters,
aggregate productivity declined substantially in a large number of industries in
Spanish manufacturing. We also briefly explore two factors that might help ex-
plain the surprisingly strong export performance of Spain in the aftermath of the
great trade collapse: improved aggregate competitiveness due to internal and ex-
ternal devaluation and a substitutive relationship between domestic and foreign
sales at the firm level.
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1 Introduction
The global recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis continues to place a heavy
burden on the world economy. One important aspect of the crisis that has caught a
lot of attention among both policymakers and economists was the sudden, synchro-
nized, and more than proportional decline in global trade relative to global production
– the so-called “great trade collapse” (Baldwin, 2009). While the causes and conse-
quences of this event have been subject to extensive debate, the available evidence
derives largely from aggregate data rather than from detailed firm-level data.1 This
is somewhat surprising, since the issue of firm heterogeneity and the fact that only a
fraction of firms access foreign markets have become cornerstones of modern trade lit-
erature. To what extent have firms decided to leave foreign markets in response to the
crisis? Are firms today relying less on imports and exports than before the crisis? And
did firms perform better or worse during the crisis if they were active on foreign mar-
kets? A fine-grained analysis of the micro-structure of international trade in the years
surrounding the financial crisis can provide answers to these questions by uncovering
patterns in the data that would go unnoticed in an analysis based on aggregate data
alone.
The objective of this paper is to provide such a fine-grained analysis using a rep-
resentative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms over the period 2005-2012. Spain
is a particularly interesting case to look into. On the one hand, the country was deeply
affected by the financial crisis and subsequent recession. In the first half of 2009, real
industrial production contracted by 21.4% relative to the first half of 2008.2 Impor-
tantly, Spain went through very difficult times also after the financial crisis. Following
zero growth in 2010, total production contracted again in 2011-2013, reflecting what
is sometimes called a “double dip” recession. On the other hand, and perhaps surpris-
ingly, the country showed a relatively strong export performance over the crisis period.
Figure 1 demonstrates that the Spanish economy was able to improve its competitive
position on international markets compared to other economies in Europe. For exam-
ple, between 2007 and 2013 exports from Italy and France decreased by 10% and 7%,
respectively. In contrast, exports from Spain increased by 13% over the same period.
This development (celebrated by some as the “Spanish export miracle”3) put Spain
ahead of not only other countries in economic turmoil, but also countries that quickly
returned to economic growth after 2008, such as Germany and the UK.
1 Important contributions using aggregate or sector-level trade data include Chor and Manova (2012)
and Eaton et al. (2016). We discuss the existing micro-level evidence further below.
2 Annual industrial production in 2009 declined by 16.2% relative to 2008. For real manufacturing
exports, the same number is 21.2%. The data come from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica (INE).
3 See, for example, the article “El milagro del sector exterior de España: admirable, pero con algunos
claroscuros,” published on May 10th, 2013, in the Spanish daily newspaper elEconomista.es.
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Figure 1: Export volumes, 2007-2013†
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†Note: The data are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World Bank.
In this paper, we zoom in on the Spanish crisis experience. Adopting a micro-level
perspective on Spanish firms allows us to investigate two important issues related to
the crisis episode that remain obscure in aggregate data. First, we can disentangle the
effects of the crisis at the extensive and the intensive firm-level margins of trade, i.e.,
we can separate a firm’s decision to access foreign markets at all from the volume of
a firm’s exports and imports (as shares of its total sales and purchases, respectively).
This distinction is crucial for the purpose of our analysis and allows us to address
two interesting questions: Did aggregate trade decline because of firms exiting for-
eign markets, or because of a contraction in firm-level trade volumes? And was the
subsequent recovery and export boom due to firms scaling up their exports, or due
to new firms entering foreign markets? These questions are important because a de-
struction of cross-border trade linkages at the firm level can have long-lasting adverse
effects on the economy (Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2016), and these effects are
not expected for adjustments at the intensive margin. Conversely, the entry of new
exporters might soften the adverse effects of the crisis by increasing the potential for
future economic growth, because new exporters in Spain are more likely to engage in
productivity-enhancing technology upgrading than non-exporters (Hanley and Pérez,
2012). In terms of methodology, we follow the literature estimating firm-level mod-
els of exporting and importing based on panel data (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1997,
1999). However, this literature is typically interested in the evolution of firm-specific
characteristics (e.g. productivity, management, or labor force composition) and how
these influence firms’ export and import decisions, respectively. In contrast, our focus
is on the direct effects of the financial crisis and subsequent recession, i.e., changes in
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macro conditions that are beyond the control of individual firms.
The second issue we investigate are differences in firm performance and crisis re-
silience between exporting and non-exporting firms. Since exporting firms are known
to be larger and more productive, on average, than non-exporting firms, their behavior
can be important for aggregate outcomes. It is thus crucial to understand the perfor-
mance of these firms in times of exceptional economic distress. Does exporting to
foreign markets make firms more immune to shocks, or does it make them more vul-
nerable? This is an interesting question that should be settled empirically, as there
exist theoretical arguments supporting either view. While allocating sales across var-
ious markets, domestically and abroad, insures the firm against an adverse demand
shock in one market, there is also a substantial risk involved in exporting (e.g. cur-
rency risk, non-payment risk, transport risk etc.), and relying on foreign markets in
times of a globally synchronized crisis might prove particularly harmful to firm per-
formance. To answer this question, we estimate differences between exporters and
non-exporters in terms of size, productivity, and survival, so-called exporter premia
(Bernard and Jensen, 1999), and we study the evolution of these premia over the cri-
sis years. Importantly, increasing exporter premia during the crisis could be taken as
an indication that economies become less vulnerable to economic shocks through ex-
porting. Furthermore, if it is primarily non-exporting firms that are forced to exit the
market due to the crisis, then this might (in the medium to long run) induce a realloca-
tion of resources away from non-exporting firms towards exporting firms, where they
are put to more efficient use. The same logic applies if for non-exporters the evolution
of productivity through the crisis and afterwards is less favorable than for exporters.
Hence, differences in crisis performance of exporters vs. non-exporters are relevant
also for the long-run growth perspective of the Spanish economy.
The main results of our empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First,
the sharp drop in international trade that the Spanish manufacturing sector experienced
in 2009 took place at the intensive margin, not the extensive margin. This means that,
while the financial crisis caused a strong reduction in firm-level imports and exports, it
did not prompt firms to exit foreign markets altogether. In the years after the financial
crisis, we do see changes at the extensive margin, but we see more, rather than less,
firms starting to enter foreign markets. As a result, there is now a larger share of firms
involved in international trade than before the crisis. Furthermore, firms have diversi-
fied their export portfolios to include more distant destinations outside the European
Union.
Second, while firms active in the export market saw their export volumes plummet
in the financial crisis, this decline was not limited to exports, but rather, it was visible
to the same extent in their domestic sales. This observation might seem surprising in
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light of the discussion about the great trade collapse. Moreover, the decline in exports
was fully made up for (and even overcompensated) already by 2011. Those firms that
entered the financial crisis as exporters have in fact been allocating ever larger shares
of their production to foreign markets over the past few years. It seems that these firms
have effectively compensated for the lack of domestic demand by expanding their sales
abroad. In this sense, firms in the Spanish manufacturing sector are on average more,
not less, ‘globalized’ today than they were before the financial crisis.
Third, we find that it made a significant difference for key economic performance
indicators (such as jobs, productivity, and survival) whether or not firms were active
on export markets when the crisis hit the Spanish economy. While all firms strongly
reduced their output and laid off large numbers of workers during and after the financial
crisis, firms that entered the crisis as exporters (and continued to export throughout the
crisis years) saved more jobs, stayed more productive, and were more likely to survive.
One of the more alarming findings is that from 2007 to 2009 firms’ average total factor
productivity (TFP) deteriorated by around 15%. For non-exporters, TFP continued to
decline by another 15% from 2009 to 2011. Exporters, in contrast, maintained about
the same level of productivity in 2011 as they had in 2009. Our analysis also shows
that aggregate TFP in the Spanish manufacturing sector declined as a result of the
crisis.
After having documented these facts, we explore two possible explanations for the
favorable development of Spanish exports after the financial crisis. The point of de-
parture of both explanations is the fact that aggregate demand was hit much harder
in Spain than in most other large economies, both within and outside the European
Union. We argue (and provide evidence for the idea) that, as a result of this, the Span-
ish economy has become more competitive internationally through internal as well as
external devaluation. This is the first explanation we discuss in our paper. The sec-
ond explanation is that the more than proportional decline in domestic demand has
prompted firms to substitute domestic with foreign sales. Importantly, such a response
is not implied by the standard Melitz (2003) model, but has recently been rationalized
in trade models in which short-run production costs are convex in total output (Blum
et al., 2013; Soderbery, 2014; Vannoorenberghe, 2012). We present some evidence
drawn from our data that is consistent with this idea. However, we should like to em-
phasize that a rigorous causal analysis or an investigation into the relative importance
of the two explanations for the strong export performance of the Spanish economy is
beyond the scope of our paper. In a similar vein, we do not wish to claim that these
two explanations are the most important, let alone the only, factors behind the strong
export performance of the Spanish economy.
Our paper contributes to the small empirical literature that investigates firm behav-
4
ior in response to the financial crisis with a focus on firms’ trading activities. Two
prominent studies in this literature using French and Belgian data, respectively, are
by Bricongne et al. (2012) and Behrens et al. (2013), who carefully gauge the crisis-
induced drop in international trade along the dimensions of firms, products, and trading
partners.4 Closely related to our paper are the studies by Giri et al. (2014) and Álvarez
and Sáez (2014), which provide evidence on exports and firm performance during and
after the crisis using Mexican and Chilean firm-level data, respectively. Studies with a
particular focus on firm survival over the crisis years depending on firms’ trading activ-
ities are Costa et al. (2014, for Italy) and Görg and Spaliara (2014, for the UK). There
seems to be a consensus emerging from this literature that most of the crisis adjust-
ment in firm exports took place at the intensive margin. Exporting firms are typically
found to be more resilient to the crisis and there is some evidence that firms’ financial
conditions played a relevant role for their crisis performance.5 We complement this
literature with evidence on both importing and exporting firms in Spain during and af-
ter the financial crisis. More generally, our paper fits into the large empirical literature
analyzing firm heterogeneity in international trade. Reviews of this literature can be
found in Bernard et al. (2012) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007).
Our paper also relates to an ongoing discussion about the export performance of
the Spanish economy in the period before the financial crisis. Antràs (2011) observes
that the share of Spanish exports in world trade was stable throughout the period 2000-
2010 despite rising unit labor costs relative to other Eurozone countries between 2000
and 2008. As trade models with homogeneous firms cannot account for this fact,
he argues in favor of an explanation based on firm heterogeneity. Correa-López and
Doménech (2012) suggest that a number of strategic actions taken at the firm level
(e.g. technology and skill upgrading, product innovations, and financial optimization)
contributed to the internationalization of Spanish firms over the period 1990-2010.
In contrast to these studies, we focus explicitly on the years surrounding the financial
crisis, which involved a number of particular challenges and changes in the competitive
position of Spanish firms. In addition, we document and analyze differences in firm
performance and crisis resilience in relation to firms’ export activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data
used in our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the main analysis of our paper. We
start with a decomposition of changes in total trade into extensive and intensive mar-
gins in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 analyzes the probability of firms to engage in exporting
and importing before, during, and after the financial crisis. Section 3.3 proceeds by an-
alyzing how firms allocated their sales across the foreign and the domestic market and
4 Abreha et al. (2016) provide evidence for Denmark.
5 For micro-level evidence regarding the credit shock on exports in the global financial crisis see also
Görg and Spaliara (2013) and Paravisini et al. (2014).
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which share of their purchases they chose to source from abroad (rather than domesti-
cally). In Section 3.4, we take up the issue of firm competitiveness and crisis resilience
by investigating performance differences depending on firms’ export status. Section 4
provides a discussion of two important factors that are likely to have contributed to the
strong export performance of the Spanish economy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Firm-level data
The primary data source for our analysis is the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empre-
sariales (ESEE, or Survey on Business Strategies). The ESEE is an annual survey
of about 2,000 Spanish manufacturing firms with 10 or more employees. It includes
rich information on strategic firm decisions (such as pricing, international trade and
investment activities, or innovation strategies) along with key items of firms’ balance
sheets as well as profit and loss statements. Importantly, the ESEE is a panel data
set representative for the Spanish manufacturing sector at large and covering the pe-
riod 1990-2012. This data set allows us to provide a comprehensive, high-resolution
perspective on the micro-structure of international trade, and to portray the evolution
of Spanish manufacturing over the years before, during, and after the financial crisis.
The initial sampling of the data in 1990 had a two-tier structure, combining exhaustive
sampling for firms with more than 200 employees and stratified sampling for firms
with 10-200 employees. In later years, special efforts have been devoted to minimiz-
ing the incidences of panel exit as well as to including new firms through refreshment
samples aimed at preserving the representativeness of the data.6
The sample we use for our analysis covers the period 2005-2012 (unless indicated
otherwise). It consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 3,100 firms, roughly 800
of which are observed throughout the entire period. The ESEE uses the main activ-
ity (industries at the 2-digit level of the NACE Rev. 2 classification)7 and the size
group of firms (in terms of the number of employees) as stratification variables. It dis-
tinguishes between 20 different industries and six different size groups defined by the
average number of workers employed during the year: 10-20; 21-50; 51-100; 101-200;
201-500; >500. As far as the descriptive analysis is concerned, we employ sampling
weights to account for the sampling scheme used to collect the data.8 When applying
regression methods in our analysis, we use fixed effects for the sampling strata (de-
6 More detailed information on the design, management, and sampling properties of the survey are
available from the Spanish Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) foundation at
https://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/en/epresentacion.asp.
7 Until 2009, the survey defined industries according to the NACE Rev. 1 classification. We accom-
modate the two classifications based on concordance information provided by the SEPI foundation.
8 Sampling weights are based on the composition of the population of Spanish firms in 2010, taken
from INE: http://www.ine.es/en/inebmenu/mnu_empresas_en.htm.
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fined by pairs of industries and size groups) in order to obtain consistent estimation
of the parameters of interest. Summary statistics of the most important variables used
in our empirical analysis can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A. Throughout the
paper, we express all value variables in constant 2010 prices using industry-level price
indexes from INE (similarly to Guadalupe et al., 2012).
A particularly important variable in our analysis is a firm’s total factor productiv-
ity (TFP). We obtain TFP as a firm-specific and time-varying residual from industry-
specific Cobb-Douglas production functions, which we estimate by the consistent
three-step procedure proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). This procedure derives from
a dynamic model of firm behavior incorporating firm-specific productivity differences
that exhibit idiosyncratic changes through time. The model tackles a potential endo-
geneity issue due to simultaneity between input choices and unobserved productivity
shocks by using firm-specific capital investments as a proxy variable. In contrast to
an alternative approach proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the model by Olley
and Pakes (1996) also takes into account the issue of sample selection due to firms en-
tering and exiting the market. This is potentially important for the period of economic
turbulence considered in our analysis. We estimate industry-specific production func-
tions by using annual ESEE data on a firm’s value added, investment, capital stock,
labor employment, and market exit decisions over the period 2000-2012. Value added
is the sum of the total production value plus other operating income (i.e., income from
rent and leasing, industrial property, commissions, and certain services), minus the
total expenditure on intermediate inputs and external services. Investment is the total
investment value in tangible fixed assets (land, buildings, and equipment). The capital
stock is the value of tangible fixed assets. Labor employment is measured in effective
working hours. As regards exit decisions of firms, our data allow us to distinguish
firms shutting down production from those that stay in the market but exit the ESEE
panel for other reasons.9
A brief comment on the measure of labor employment that we use in our analysis
seems in order. In contrast to many other firm-level data sets used in the literature,
the ESEE data include an almost ideal measure of labor employment, namely effective
working hours. This reduces the possibility of measurement error and thus mitigates
endogeneity concerns in the estimation of firm-level TFP. Since the ESEE data also
include a more common measure of labor employment (the average number of work-
ers a firm employs during a year), we can investigate different firm-level margins of
labor adjustment, viz. the number of workers (or jobs) and the number of effective
working hours. Interestingly, we find very small differences in the within-firm varia-
tion between these two variables. This implies that the reductions in effective working
9 Detailed results from these TFP estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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hours observed at the firm level are fully attributable to workers being laid off and jobs
being lost.
While the focus of our analysis is on Spain, we occasionally also draw on firm-level
survey data from the EFIGE project, which was designed to enhance the understand-
ing of how European firms and economies are affected by the process of globalization
(Altomonte and Aquilante, 2012).10 This data set enables us to compare firms in Spain
with firms in six other European countries in the year 2008: Austria, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, and the UK. It includes 14,444 firms and, importantly, it is also repre-
sentative of manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees in these countries. The
focus of the EFIGE data is on the experience and competition of firms in foreign mar-
kets, as well as their responses to the challenges posed by the financial crisis. Among
the firm-level information included in the data set are: sales, employment, innovation
activities, international investment, and values of imports and exports.11 The data set
also includes some questions on the changes in sales, employment, and trade values in
the year 2009.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Decomposition of changes in total trade
We start by decomposing changes in both exports and imports in the Spanish manu-
facturing sector into extensive and intensive margins. We do this along the lines of
Bernard et al. (2009) and Behrens et al. (2013) using the ESEE firm-level data set. To-
tal exports in any given year t can be written as the product of the number of exporters
(the extensive margin) in t and the average value of exports per exporting firm (the
intensive margin) in t: exportst = number of exporterst ⇥ average exportst. Hence,
we can decompose changes in total exports (and analogously for imports) as follows:
 exportst
exportst 1
⇡  number of exporterst
number of exporterst 1
+
 average exportst
average exportst 1
, (1)
where exportst ⌘ exportst exportst 1 (and accordingly for the number of exporters
and average exports).
Table 1 shows the decomposition of annual changes in total exports and imports
according to Equation (1) over the period 2006-2012. Total trade in the Spanish man-
ufacturing sector contracted in both years 2008 and 2009, with a drop of more than
10 The EFIGE project is called “European firms in a global economy: Internal policies for external
competitiveness.”
11 Altomonte et al. (2012) provide a full-fledged analysis of firms in different countries based on the
EFIGE data set. Crespo et al. (2011) use the data to specifically compare firms in Spain with firms
in other European countries.
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15% in exports and more than 20% in imports in the main crisis year 2009. Impor-
tantly, these changes took place almost exclusively at the intensive margin of trade.
More specifically, on the export side, average exports per firm decreased by 15% in
2009, which means that the intensive margin almost fully explains the overall drop
in exports. On the import side, trade at the extensive margin even increased slightly
in 2009, counteracting the drop at the intensive margin. It is interesting that exports
quickly recovered in 2010 and 2011, in particular at the intensive margin, while im-
ports had not recovered by the year 2012 (the last year of data we use in our analysis).
In 2011, both exports and imports decreased slightly at the extensive margin, but in-
creased again quite spectacularly in 2012.12
Table 1: Decomposition of annual changes in total trade in Spanish manufacturing†Table 1: Decomposition of annual cha ges in aggregate trade†
Exports Imports
Total Extens. Intens. Total Extens. Intens.
exports margin margin imports margin margin
2006 9.74 8.20 -1.09 19.26 6.84 11.39
2007 13.11 0.99 8.15 15.05 0.44 15.08
2008 -0.27 2.59 -2.69 -4.18 -0.86 -2.83
2009 -15.36 -0.47 -15.14 -20.26 0.12 -20.27
2010 6.86 3.26 4.02 5.28 1.91 5.48
2011 10.63 -4.15 15.16 3.74 -2.65 7.25
2012 3.62 13.90 -8.78 -5.32 9.48 -13.79
†Note: This table
shows annual percentage changes in real exports and imports and in the respective extensive and intensive
margins. Sampling weights apply. Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESEE data.
Table 2: Decomposition of annual changes in aggregate trade†
†Note: This table shows annual percentage changes in real exports and imports and
in the respective extensive and intensive margins. Sampling weights apply. Source:
Authors’ calculations based on ESEE data..
35
†Note: This table shows annual percentage changes in total exports and imports in
Spanish manufacturing, as well as a corresponding decomposition into extensive and
intensive margins. Sampling weights apply. Source: Authors’ calculations based on
ESEE data.
Two comments on this decomposition exercise are in order. First, the changes at
the intensive margin that we examine here are changes that took place at the level of
the firm. Hence, they may include adjustments at several additional extensive margins
that are only visible at a more disaggregated level: the number of products traded, the
number of destination and source countries, and the number of buyers and sellers for
each firm. While we cannot disentangle these margins for Spain, Behrens et al. (2013)
find in more disaggregated data from Belgium that even within firm-country-product
cells the intensive margin accounts for 97% of the overall drop in Belgian exports
caused by the crisis.
12 The decrease in both exports and imports at the intensive margin of trade in 2012 stems in part from
the comparatively low volume of trade by foreign market entrants in that year.
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Second, in the above decomposition we hold all prices constant, so that changes
at the intensive margin of trade are due to changes in the quantities traded (rather
than changes in the prices of traded products). To shed some light on the evolution
of nominal trade values, we examine annual variations in both sales prices and input
prices. We find that on average firms lowered their sales prices in 2009, but only
by 0.59%.13 In contrast, the prices of inputs continued to rise in 2009, though at a
lower rate (1.70%) than before or after 2009. Overall, we can thus say that nominal
trade values dropped sharply in 2009, but that this drop is due to a reduction in the
quantities traded rather than a decline in prices.
3.2 Foreign market entry and exit
In this section, we focus on the extensive margin of trade. What share of firms in the
Spanish manufacturing sector is active on foreign markets? And how did this share de-
velop over the recent period of financial and economic turmoil? When looking at the
full sample of firms, we find that in the pre-crisis period 2005-2008 on average 46%
of all firms were exporters, while 43% were importers; see Figure 2a. We observe
significant overlap between exporter and importer status, reflected in 30% of firms in
2005 being engaged in both exporting and importing at the same time (not depicted).
This suggests that exporting and importing are complementary activities at the level
of the firm, an issue that has been taken up in recent research and to which we will
return below. Two observations stand out. First, there was only a very small decrease
in the shares of exporting and importing firms in 2009, following the peak of the fi-
nancial crisis. Second, both shares rose sharply in the subsequent years. By 2012, the
shares of exporters and importers had both grown to all-time highs of 57% and 51%,
respectively.14
While these numbers suggest a growing tendency among firms to serve foreign
markets, they partly reflect firm entry into and exit from production, as well as changes
in the sample composition over time (due to sample attrition caused by nonresponse
of firms, as well as due to the inclusion of new firms through refreshment samples).
For this reason, in Figure 2b, we balance the sample on firms that are observed in each
year from 2005 to 2012. This allows for a clean view on changes at the extensive
margin of trade among incumbent and surviving firms.15 The figure confirms that,
13 This drop was only slightly larger for exporters (-0.71%) than for non-exporters (-0.48%).
14 These are the highest trade participation shares observed over the period 1990-2012 (i.e., the period
for which ESEE data were available at the time of writing this paper); see http://www.fundacionsepi.
es/investigacion/esee/en/salgunos_resultados.asp.
15 Note that the sample used in Figure 2b is thus not representative for the manufacturing sector at
large. It is in fact biased towards larger firms (in terms of output and employment), as these were
more likely to survive the crisis. This bias explains why trade participation rates in 2005 are higher
in the balanced sample than in the full sample.
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whether we look at exporting or at importing, the financial crisis had a very small
impact on the extensive margin of trade in 2009. Instead, we see constant or rising
trade participation rates over time. The share of exporters has been subject to a slight
upward trend that was only shortly interrupted in 2010, but accelerated thereafter and
reached more than 51% in 2012 (up from less than 47% in 2005). Import participation,
in contrast, has not changed much in the balanced sample. Before the financial crisis,
the share of importers stood at about 47%. In 2009, the year following the peak of
the financial crisis, this share decreased by one percentage point. Although it has
been increasing in each year thereafter, import participation has not returned to its pre-
crisis level by 2012. In any case, the figure shows that the overall changes that we find
around the crisis years are rather small for incumbent and surviving firms. Importantly,
the apparent differences in the evolution of trade participation rates across the full
sample and the balanced sample (Figures 2a and 2b) can be reconciled by differential
firm survival rates across trading and non-trading firms. We will take this issue up in
Section 3.4, where we show that firms that entered the crisis as exporters had higher
chances to survive the crisis than firms that were confined to the domestic market.
Figure 2: Trade participation, 2005-2012†
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†Note: In Figure 2a we use the full sample of firms, whereas in Figure 2b we balance the sample on
782 firms that are observed in each year from 2005 to 2012. Sampling weights apply. Source: Authors’
calculations based on ESEE data.
Do these numbers mask important variation across source and destination coun-
tries? A regional decomposition of trade available for 2006 and 2010 allows us to
provide a preliminary answer to this question.16 In Figure 3, where we balance the
sample on firms that are observed in both years, we see very little time variation in
export participation for most world regions that we can distinguish in our data: the
European Union (EU), Latin America, the rest of the OECD, and the rest of the world
16 Information on the composition of imports and exports by world region is available in ESEE every
four years.
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(ROW, a residual category, including all of Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia except
Japan and South Korea). 43-44% of all firms exported to the EU, 12-13% exported to
Latin America, and 17-18% exported to other OECD countries. This cross-sectional
pattern is broadly consistent with a gravity model of trade in which distance and mar-
ket size play important roles. The largest change over time can be observed for exports
to the ROW, where export participation increased by more than one fifth (from 18%
in 2006 to 22% in 2010). Hence, the average exporting firm started to penetrate new
markets over the crisis years, and thus diversified its export portfolio. This observation
is consistent with the behavior observed for Danish firms, which started to enter new
markets (especially in Asia) during the recovery after the financial crisis (Abreha et al.,
2016).17 We find similar changes over time for imports as we do for exports. However,
the overall share of firms importing from regions other than the EU is relatively small,
especially compared to that of exporters: in 2010, it was 3% for Latin America, 8%
for other OECD countries, and 13% for the ROW (up from 11% in 2006).
Figure 3: Trade participation by region, 2006 and 2010†
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†Note: The sample is balanced on 1,247 firms observed in both years 2006 and 2010. In this sample, 780
(780) firms reported positive exports (imports) in 2006, and 797 (770) reported positive exports (imports)
in 2010. Sampling weights apply. Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESEE data.
17 Similar evidence is provided for Chile and Italy by Álvarez and Sáez (2014) and Costa et al. (2014),
respectively.
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How do the numbers we find for Spain compare with those observed for other
European countries? To answer this question, we exploit the EFIGE data set, which
provides consistent trade participation shares for seven European countries in 2008.
We find, perhaps surprisingly, that among these countries, export participation is low-
est in Germany (41%) and France (45%), closely followed by Spain (48%), while
Austria and the UK have much higher exporter shares (56%), exceeded only by Italy
(63%). German firms also report the lowest importer share (25%), followed by Italy
(35%) and Spain (40%).18 The highest import participation is found for France, where
more than half of all firms engage in importing.
We next estimate a series of probability models for both exporting and importing.
This allows us to narrow down the factors that were crucial for trade participation over
the crisis years. To do so, we distinguish between those factors that are directly related
to the financial crisis and subsequent recession (i.e., macro-level changes taking place
outside the firm and captured in our analysis by year dummies) and those related to
the evolution of firm-specific characteristics (i.e., micro-level changes taking place
inside the firm). The latter also capture indirect effects of the financial crisis (e.g. if
some firms experienced a decline in their productivity over time). In order to account
for (and exploit) possible complementarities between exporting and importing at the
firm level, we estimate two equations simultaneously in a bivariate Probit framework.
More specifically, we define two indicator variables, one for the export status of a firm,
Exporterit, and one for its import status, Importerit. The variable Exporterit is equal
to one if firm i reports positive exports at time t (and zero otherwise), and accordingly
for Importerit. We assume that a firm exports if current and expected revenues from
exporting are greater than costs:
Exporterit =
(
1 if ⇧eit > 0
0 otherwise,
where ⇧eit is the unobserved (latent) net present value of current and expected profits
from exporting. We assume that these can be linearly approximated as follows:
⇧eit =  
e ·Xeit +  et +  ei +  eks + "eit, (2)
whereXeit is a column vector collecting time-varying firm characteristics,  
e is a vec-
tor of parameters to be estimated,  et is a year fixed effect,  ei is a firm-specific effect,
19
 eks is a constant specific to the industry-size-group combination corresponding to firm
i in year t (with industries being indexed by k and size groups by s), and "eit is a
18 As far as imports are concerned, the EFIGE data tend to underestimate trade participation, as the
questionnaire is limited to imports of goods and services that are used in the production process.
19 We impose different assumptions on the firm-specific effect  `i , as we shall detail below.
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firm-and-year-specific stochastic profit shock. An expression similar to Equation (2)
is assumed for importing:
⇧iit =  
i ·Xiit +  it +  ii +  iks + "iit. (3)
In contrast to much of the existing literature, we estimate the decisions of exporting and
importing jointly. This strategy is motivated by recent evidence on fixed and sunk cost
complementarity between the two activities (Kasahara and Lapham, 2013).20 We thus
assume that the stochastic profit shocks are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution:"
"eit
"iit
#
⇠ N
 "
0
0
#
,
"
1  
  1
#!
,
where   is a parameter measuring the (residual) correlation between exporting and
importing. Allowing (and testing) for   > 0 is important in our analysis, as it tells us
whether a firm-specific negative effect of the crisis that directly affected one activity
spilled over to the other activity (and thus entailed more harmful consequences than
the direct effect alone).
In the model described above, we are mainly interested in the year fixed effects,
 `05, . . . ,  
`
12, ` 2 {e, i}, as these indicate changes in the profitability of exporting and
importing over time that cannot be explained by the firm-specific variables collected
in X`it. The year fixed effects thus pick up the (net) macro-level effects driven by
changes in both demand-side and supply-side factors. The variables contained in X`it
are: labor productivity (value added over effective working hours, in logs) to control
for the firm’s level of competitiveness;21 capital intensity (tangible fixed assets over
the number of workers, in logs); R&D intensity (R&D expenses over sales, in logs);
skill intensity (number of graduate workers over total number of workers, in logs);
foreign ownership (as dummy variables indicating the share of foreign capital in the
firm’s joint capital: 0%,>0%&<=50%, or>50%); multinational corporation (MNC)
status (as a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has a foreign affiliate); the type
of good produced (as dummy variables indicating final goods, intermediate goods, or
not defined); and, in the case of exporting, internet presence (as a dummy variable
indicating whether the firm is operating a website). Including a dummy for internet
presence in the equation for exports, but not for imports, is based on the idea that a
website is important as part of the firm’s marketing and distribution strategy, but has
no impact on the firm’s purchasing and sourcing activities. Importantly, the fact that
Xeit 6= Xiit leads to efficiency gains in the estimation.
20 Aristei et al. (2013) also investigate the two-way relationship between exporting and importing.
21 In alternative specifications we use estimated TFP (rather than labor productivity) to control for the
firm’s competitiveness, to find that our main results do not change with this modification.
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In our first estimation of the bivariate Probit model in Equations (2) and (3), we
treat  `i as a random variable that is uncorrelated with the other covariates. We com-
pute marginal effects evaluated at the sample means of all regressors. For the year
dummies for 2006-2012, the effects can be interpreted as conditional differences in
trade participation compared to the base year 2005. Statistical inference is based on
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level, which allows for arbitrary forms of
heteroskedasticity and accounts for the autocorrelation implied by the firm-specific
effect  `i .
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 report the estimation results. In line with the
descriptive evidence presented in Table 1 and Figure 2, there is no indication of a sig-
nificant decline in import or export participation in the years surrounding the financial
crisis (2007-2009). On the contrary, our results suggest that macro-level developments
in the aftermath of the financial crisis (those beyond the influence of individual firms)
have prompted more firms to access foreign markets. We find that the probability of
exporting is 4.1 percentage points (or 9.1%) higher in 2012 than it was in the base year
2005. The same number for importing is 3.2 percentage points (7.3%). Statistically
significant differences between pre- and post-crisis export and import participation are
first visible in 2012. These differences cannot be explained by the firm-level char-
acteristics that the literature has consistently identified to influence both exports and
imports at the extensive margin (such as productivity), as these are controlled for in
the estimation. Regarding these firm-specific control variables, we find that the results
accord well with known stylized facts. We find that those firms that are more pro-
ductive as well as those more intensive in capital, R&D, and skills are more inclined
to both exporting and importing. Moreover, we see large and significant differences
(with a two-digit margin) between foreign-owned and domestically owned firms, as
well as between MNCs and non-MNCs. Finally, the results demonstrate strong firm-
level complementarities between exporting and importing ( ˆ = 0.525, significant at
the 1% level).
One important limitation of the bivariate Probit model is that identification is based
on between-firm variation in the data, and that the model thus assumes firm-specific
unobserved heterogeneity (denoted by  `i above) to be uncorrelated with the other co-
variates. However, it is likely that unobserved firm characteristics with strong serial
correlation (such as managerial ability) do not only affect a firm’s decision to access
foreign markets, but that they are also correlated with the other covariates in the model
(e.g. productivity). Addressing this issue by estimating firm fixed effects in the Pro-
bit framework suffers from the incidental parameters problem and would hence result
in inconsistent estimation of all model parameters. We therefore estimate a system
of seemingly unrelated regression equations with fixed effects (SUR FE), where each
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Table 2: Probability model for trade participation†
Exporter Importer Exporter Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year dummy 2006 -0.00773 0.00407 0.00769 0.0175***
(0.00715) (0.00785) (0.00547) (0.00670)
Year dummy 2007 -0.00925 -0.00499 0.00930 0.0157**
(0.00829) (0.00895) (0.00616) (0.00757)
Year dummy 2008 -0.00521 -0.00292 0.00951 0.0181**
(0.00936) (0.00966) (0.00648) (0.00787)
Year dummy 2009 -0.00716 -0.0135 0.00989 0.0116
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00720) (0.00851)
Year dummy 2010 0.000998 -0.0202* 0.00881 0.0114
(0.0112) (0.0116) (0.00698) (0.00876)
Year dummy 2011 0.0186 0.00836 0.0196*** 0.0275***
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.00738) (0.00898)
Year dummy 2012 0.0406*** 0.0317** 0.0323*** 0.0426***
(0.0126) (0.0128) (0.00773) (0.00977)
Labor productivity (in logs) 0.0486*** 0.0657*** 0.0144*** 0.0210***
(0.00817) (0.00797) (0.00490) (0.00641)
Capital intensity (in logs) 0.0404*** 0.0471*** -0.00330 -0.0275***
(0.00684) (0.00592) (0.00792) (0.00972)
R&D intensity (in logs) 1.218*** 1.596*** -0.0604 -0.00165
(0.364) (0.318) (0.160) (0.244)
Skill intensity (in logs) 0.0604 0.127*** -0.00109 -0.0317
(0.0394) (0.0437) (0.0204) (0.0286)
Multinational dummy 0.261*** 0.112*** 0.00199 0.0591**
(0.0313) (0.0259) (0.0170) (0.0274)
Type of good: intermediate good 0.0587*** 0.00696 0.0171 0.0276
(0.0185) (0.0173) (0.0139) (0.0171)
Type of good: not defined -0.0228 -0.0591*** 0.00808 0.0364**
(0.0181) (0.0164) (0.0135) (0.0179)
Foreign ownership: > 0% & <= 50 % 0.0490 0.00693 -0.0255 -0.00557
(0.0588) (0.0478) (0.0273) (0.0360)
Foreign ownership: > 50% 0.212*** 0.174*** 0.00840 0.0179
(0.0289) (0.0264) (0.0182) (0.0184)
Internet dummy 0.124*** 0.0309**
(0.0127) (0.0124)
Industry-size-group fixed effects
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Number of firms
Cross-equation correlation 
R2 0.0071 0.0127
Bivariate Probit Model SUR Fixed Effects Model
14,887 13,209
0.525***
2,601
0.112***
Yes Yes
No Yes
2,860
†Note: This table presents estimated marginal effects on both export and import probabilities obtained
from fitting a bivariate Probit model (columns (1) and (2)), as well as a system of seemingly unrelated
regression equations (SUR) with fixed effects (columns (3) and (4)). The dependent variables are dummy
variables indicating positive exports or imports, respectively. For dummy variables as regressors we
report the effects of a discrete change from zero to one. In the bivariate Probit model, marginal effects
are evaluated at the sample means of all regressors. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level)
are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. Source:
Authors’ estimations based on ESEE data.
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equation describes a linear probability model rather than a non-linear Probit model.
On the one hand, this model may deliver implausible predictions for the trading proba-
bilities outside the unit interval. On the other hand, it has the advantage of controlling
for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity through firm fixed effects. Identification
of the parameters of interest then comes from within-firm variation in the data, i.e.,
changes in export and import participation over time.22
The estimation results for the SUR FE model are reported in columns (3) and (4)
of Table 2. The main conclusions drawn from the bivariate Probit model are upheld in
this model. In particular, there is no evidence that the financial crisis had any detrimen-
tal effect on trade participation. On the contrary, the probability of exporting increased
by 3.2 percentage points over the period 2005-2012 due to macro-level effects (statisti-
cally significantly at the 1% level). On the import side, we find positive and significant
effects in the years 2006 to 2008, but again the probability of importing was signifi-
cantly higher in 2012 than in any pre-crisis year (by 4.3 percentage points compared
to 2005). In contrast to the results obtained from the bivariate Probit model, the only
firm-specific variable that consistently and significantly increases the probability of
both exporting and importing is productivity. Hence, a firm that experiences a pro-
ductivity gain over time is more likely to enter foreign markets.23 This finding adds
to the overwhelming evidence emphasizing the importance of firm heterogeneity in
the study of international trade, and it is consistent with the seminal work by Melitz
(2003). Finally, the positive and significant (residual) correlation between exporting
and importing is confirmed in the SUR FE model.
Thus far, we have assumed that any persistence in export status over time stems
from possible autocorrelation in the independent variables (including firm fixed ef-
fects) and the errors. Similar to other firm-level data sets, persistence in export status
is indeed a salient feature of our data. Balancing the panel on 1,037 firms that are
observed in each year from 2005-2010, we find that 601 firms exported in each and
every year, while 276 firms never exported. Hence, a vast majority of 84.6% of all
firms maintained their export status throughout the six-year period considered.
There are at least two sources of persistence in export participation that we have
not considered in the models described above and that are reviewed and modeled in
Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (1997). The first is learning by
doing, which refers to the accumulation of knowledge (through production and ex-
22 Our data set includes information about unusual events that can change the scale and nature of
the firm, such as mergers, acquisitions, and divestments. We exclude such firms from the sample
whenever we exploit the within-firm variation in our analysis. This leads to a reduced sample size
in the corresponding regressions.
23 There is strong evidence in the literature for self-selection of the more productive firms into ex-
porting as well as importing; see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999), Smeets and Warzynski (2013),
and Kohler and Smolka (2014). There is also some evidence for both exporting and importing to
increase productivity; see e.g. De Loecker (2007), Halpern et al. (2015), and Feng et al. (2012).
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porting) that reduces future costs of production and exporting. The second are sunk
costs for foreign market entry, for example in the form of information and distribution
costs. Similar ideas apply to importing. While we cannot separately identify these two
channels, we may hypothesize based on the above considerations that the firm’s current
and expected profits from exporting will depend positively on past export status:
⇧eit(Exporterit 1 = 1, ·) ⇧eit(Exporterit 1 = 0, ·) > 0.
In such a dynamic framework, a negative transitory shock to foreign demand due to
the financial crisis would generate a negative effect on export participation that carries
over to future time periods (implying gradual adjustment of the probability to export).
To allow for dynamics in trade participation, we specify the following model for
exporting:
Exporterit = ⇢
e · Exporterit 1 +  e ·Xeit +  et +  ei +  eks + "eit, (4)
and accordingly for importing. Of course, the larger the autoregressive parameter (i.e.,
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable), the stronger (i.e., long-lasting) is
the dynamic effect. First, we estimate these models by the standard fixed effects ap-
proach with the right-hand side of the equation including the lagged dependent variable
(LDV FE model). Second, we use the first-differenced general method of moments
(diff-GMM) approach developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
In the LDV FE models, we apply the within-transformation to the data in order to
get rid of the firm fixed effects  ei and  
i
i , respectively. Estimates of ⇢
` in the LDV FE
models serve as lower bounds for the true parameter values.24 We find values of
⇢ˆe ⇡ 0.237 and ⇢ˆi ⇡ 0.193 (both significant at the 1% level) in the LDV FE mod-
els. In the diff-GMM approach, the model is estimated in first differences to cancel the
firm fixed effects. In addition to the lagged dependent variable, we treat labor produc-
tivity, capital intensity and foreign ownership as endogenous variables, and R&D and
skill intensity along with MNC status as pre-determined variables. Lagged levels of
the dependent variable, the predetermined variables, and the endogenous variables are
used as internal instruments. We allow for the maximum number of available lags for
use as instruments. To accommodate heteroskedasticity, we use the two-step version
of the diff-GMM estimator. We estimate values of ⇢ˆe ⇡ 0.382 and ⇢ˆi ⇡ 0.373 (both
24 The Nickell bias for the autoregressive parameter, ⇢`, is plimN!1
⇣ b⇢`   ⇢`⌘ ⇡  (1+⇢`)T , with
` 2 {e, i} and T = 7 in our application.
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significant at the 1% level) in the diff-GMM models.25
Figure 4: Dynamic probability models for trade participation†
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†Note: This figure shows estimated coefficients of year dummies in dynamic probability models as spec-
ified in Equation (4) for the exporter dummy (left-hand side) and importer dummy (right-hand side),
respectively, alongside 90% confidence intervals. The effects are changes in the probability to export and
import, respectively, relative to 2006. Source: Authors’ estimations based on ESEE data.
Figure 4 summarizes the coefficients of the year dummies in these models esti-
mated by both approaches. The LDV FE models confirm the increase in both proba-
bilities for exporting and importing after the crisis (both significant at 5% for 2012).
The diff-GMM estimations, in contrast, cannot identify any statistically significant ef-
fect of the financial crisis and subsequent recession on trade participation. Importantly,
none of our dynamic estimation approaches provides any evidence of a detrimental cri-
sis effect on the extensive margin of trade.
3.3 Export and import intensity
Next, we analyze the evolution of firms’ trade volumes (i.e., the intensive margin of
international trade). Over the pre-crisis period, the average exporter was shipping
25 Neither for exporting (p = 0.8969) nor for importing (p = 0.5363) can we reject the null hy-
pothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid (Hansen specification test of the instrument
condition). For both exporting and importing, the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in
first-differenced errors of order one is rejected (p = 0.000), while that of order two cannot be
rejected (p = 0.1733 for exporting and p = 0.5363 for importing).
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goods and services worth 11.2 million e abroad (per year), and the average importer
was purchasing goods and services worth 7.8 million e from abroad (per year). Fig-
ure 5 depicts real export values for those firms that were continuous exporters over
the period 2005-2012 (Figure 5a), and real import values for those that were contin-
uous importers (Figure 5b). The solid lines demonstrate that the financial crisis had
a very strong negative effect at the intensive margin of international trade. Real trade
values of both exporting and importing plummeted drastically from 2007 to 2009, but
recovered partly in 2010, and further so in 2011. While exports had fully recovered by
2011 and increased further in 2012, imports had not returned to their pre-crisis level
by 2012. These findings are in line with our insights from the decomposition exercise
above.
Figure 5: Sales and purchases, 2005-2012†
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†Note: In Figure 5a (Figure 5b), the sample is balanced on 456 (412) firms that are continuously exporting
(importing) over the period 2005-2012. Foreign and domestic sales (Figure 5a) as well as foreign and
domestic purchases (Figure 5b) are normalized to one in 2005. Sampling weights apply. Source: Authors’
calculations based on ESEE data.
How strong were the adjustments in 2008 and 2009 compared to the concurrent
drop in domestic activities? The dashed lines in Figure 5 show that while imports
experienced a much stronger decline than domestic purchases ( 36% versus  22%
from 2007 to 2009), the drop in domestic sales was equally pronounced as the drop in
exports ( 24%). Thus, speaking of a great trade collapse in the Spanish case, while
justified for firm-level imports, seems unwarranted when looking at firm-level exports.
Most noteworthy, however, is the shift in sales that we observe in the years after 2010,
away from the domestic market towards the foreign market. Within just two years,
exports increased by 29%. Domestic sales, in contrast, decreased by 28%. Hence, it
seems that firms were compensating for the collapse in aggregate demand in Spain (in
the course of the events associated with the European sovereign debt crisis) by chan-
neling their sales into the export market. This was possible because other countries
like France and Germany, the two largest economies in Europe and the top export des-
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tinations for Spain, had positive economic growth in each year from 2010 to 2012.
Spain, in contrast, had negative economic growth over the same period.26 The finding
that firms substituted domestic with foreign sales accords well with macro-level evi-
dence by Belke et al. (2015). We will return to this issue in our discussion in Section 4.
Importantly, the observation that the foreign market has gained in importance relative
to the domestic market has no correspondence on the import side, where domestic and
foreign purchases were largely moving in parallel to one another.
We now use regression analysis to investigate the factors influencing the trade in-
tensity of firms, defined as the share of exports in total sales or the share of imports in
total purchases, over the period 2005-2012. We should like to emphasize the differ-
ence between these shares and the levels of firms’ trade volumes; the latter we have
used to isolate changes at the ‘intensive margin’ in the decomposition exercise in Sec-
tion 3.1. There are three reasons for using the trade intensity rather than the log of
exports or imports in our estimations. First, the trade intensity is an important measure
of globalization at the firm level, which indicates how strongly firms are integrated
into the global economy through international trade.27 Second, the trade intensity is
defined not only for exporters or importers, but also for firms that do not engage in
international trade. This allows us to circumvent an obvious selection problem that
arises when non-trading firms are excluded from the sample.28 Third, we can use the
full sample of firms to investigate how export and import intensity are intertwined by
estimating the two equations (one for export intensity and one for import intensity)
simultaneously. This also leads to efficiency gains in the estimation. For these three
reasons it is both convenient and meaningful to use trade intensities as dependent vari-
ables in our regression analysis. However, for the interpretation of our results we must
keep in mind that these regressions are not suitable for showing evidence on the great
trade collapse as such, simply because domestic activity in Spain dropped substantially
as well (as is clear from Figure 5).
We estimate a SUR model, where the first equation is specified as:
ExpIntit =  
e ·Xeit +  et +  ei +  eks + "eit, (5)
with ExpIntit denoting the export intensity (exports over total sales) of firm i in year t,
and accordingly for the second equation with ImpIntit (imports over total purchases)
26 Source: Eurostat at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/.
27 Behrens et al. (2013, p. 703) also examine ratios of international activity over total activity and
point out that analyzing “the recent trade collapse using firm-level data on both trade and domestic
operations [. . . ] is necessary to gauge whether international activity has been disproportionately hit
by the crisis.”
28 We explicitly model the process governing selection into exporting or importing in a robustness
analysis discussed below.
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as the dependent variable.29 As we did above in the model for trade participation,
we assume E["eit "
i
jt|·] = 0 whenever i 6= j, whereas E["eit "iit|·] =  . In a first
specification, we treat the firm effects,  ei and  
i
i , as random variables that are not
correlated with the other covariates, and thus exploit between-firm variation in the
data. In a second specification, we relax this assumption by treating the firm effects as
fixed effects that are explicitly controlled for, and we identify the parameters of interest
from within-firm variation in the data by using SUR FE estimation.
Overall, the regression results reported in Table 3 are consistent with the evolution
of trade intensities shown in Figure 5. Importantly, we do not find evidence that firms
decreased their trade intensities due to the financial crisis. Hence, while both foreign
and domestic activity declined sharply, firms did not become less ‘globalized’ in the
crisis. On the contrary, we find a steady increase in the export intensity of firms over
the post-crisis period 2009-2012, as documented by  ˆet >  ˆet 1 for t   09. In the
SUR FE model, the year-to-year differences that we find are statistically significant
at the 1% level for t   10. The rise in the export intensity identified in the data is
not accompanied by a contemporaneous rise in import intensity, where we find no
significant differences across years.
To substantiate these results, and to address similar concerns as in the previous
section, we also consider the following dynamic specification of the model for export-
ing:
ExpIntit = ⇢
e · ExpIntit 1 +  e ·Xeit +  et +  ei +  eks + "eit, (6)
and accordingly for importing. The models are estimated alternatively by LDV FE and
diff-GMM. In the LDV FE models, we find values of ⇢ˆe ⇡ 0.220 (significant at the
1% level) and ⇢ˆi ⇡ 0.0132 (not statistically significant). In the two-step diff-GMM
estimations, we choose the same endogenous and pre-determined variables as well as
the same number of lags as in Section 3.2. We estimate values of ⇢ˆe ⇡ 0.182 and
⇢ˆi ⇡ 0.038 (both significant at the 1% level) in the diff-GMM models.30
Figure 6 shows the estimated coefficients of the year dummies in dynamic models
for the export intensity (left part) and the import intensity (right part), respectively,
alongside 90% confidence intervals. The effects are changes in the trade intensities
relative to 2006. Irrespective of the estimator we use, we find that the export intensity
of firms has been on the rise ever since 2007, and continuously throughout the years of
the financial crisis and subsequent recession. In line with the results obtained from our
29 The parameters in these equations are of course different from the ones in Equations (2) and (3), but
for convenience we use the same notation as before.
30 Neither for exporting (p = 0.3758) nor for importing (p = 0.1364) can we reject the null hy-
pothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid (Hansen specification test of the instrument
condition). For both exporting (p = 0.000) and importing (p = 0.012), the Arellano-Bond test
for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors of order one is rejected, while that of order two
cannot be rejected (p = 0.7233 for exporting and p = 0.1752 for importing).
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Table 3: Model for trade intensity†
Export intensity Import intensity Export intensity Import intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year dummy 2006 -0.00276 -0.00672 -0.00157 0.000339
(0.00353) (0.00871) (0.00252) (0.00889)
Year dummy 2007 -0.00501 -0.0132 -0.00151 -0.00423
(0.00417) (0.00897) (0.00257) (0.00893)
Year dummy 2008 -0.00521 -0.0149 -0.000320 -0.00471
(0.00492) (0.00945) (0.00294) (0.00850)
Year dummy 2009 0.00124 -0.0122 0.00566* -0.00292
(0.00586) (0.00969) (0.00302) (0.00794)
Year dummy 2010 0.0106* -0.0146 0.00871*** -0.00248
(0.00632) (0.00990) (0.00319) (0.00786)
Year dummy 2011 0.0260*** -0.00565 0.0198*** -0.000175
(0.00688) (0.0100) (0.00345) (0.00775)
Year dummy 2012 0.0453*** -0.00348 0.0358*** 0.000513
(0.00758) (0.0103) (0.00399) (0.00785)
Labor productivity (in logs) 0.0111** 0.0304*** -0.000243 0.00654**
(0.00541) (0.00413) (0.00265) (0.00304)
Capital intensity (in logs) 0.0281*** 0.0220*** 0.00428 -0.00315
(0.00401) (0.00338) (0.00304) (0.00551)
R&D intensity (in logs) 0.527*** 0.396** 0.0752 0.219
(0.178) (0.184) (0.0755) (0.299)
Skill intensity (in logs) -0.0232 0.0399** -0.00532 0.00647
(0.0189) (0.0176) (0.0123) (0.0124)
Multinational dummy 0.110*** 0.0263* 0.00142 0.0194*
(0.0182) (0.0140) (0.0125) (0.0112)
Type of good: intermediate good 0.0403*** -0.0145 0.00210 -0.0233
(0.0106) (0.0114) (0.00700) (0.0173)
Type of good: not defined 0.0366*** -0.0282*** 0.00584 -0.00172
(0.00981) (0.0107) (0.00726) (0.0122)
Foreign ownership: > 0% & <= 50 % 0.00137 0.0195 0.00899 0.00266
(0.0343) (0.0244) (0.0181) (0.0236)
Foreign ownership: > 50% 0.104*** 0.209*** 0.00731 0.0436
(0.0168) (0.0154) (0.0146) (0.0294)
Internet dummy 0.0352*** -0.00253
(0.00829) (0.00510)
Industry-size-group fixed effects
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Number of firms
Cross-equation correlation 
R2 0.370 0.289 0.0276 0.0042
14,902 13,209
2,861 2,601
0.1148*** 0.0146*
No Yes
SUR Model SUR Fixed Effects Model
Yes Yes
†Note: This table presents estimated coefficients from fitting a system of seemingly unrelated regression
equations (SUR) for export and import intensities (both without and with firm fixed effects). The depen-
dent variables are export and import intensities, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm
level) are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors’ estimations based on ESEE data.
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static models, the dynamic models do not indicate any significant change in the import
intensity over time.
Figure 6: Dynamic models for trade intensity†
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†Note: This figure shows estimated coefficients of year dummies in dynamic models as specified in Equa-
tion (6) for the export intensity (left-hand side) and the import intensity (right-hand side), respectively,
alongside 90% confidence intervals. The effects are changes in the export intensity and import intensity,
respectively, relative to 2006. Source: Authors’ estimations based on ESEE data.
Notice that we include both exporters (importers) and non-exporters (non-importers)
in the above estimations. An implicit assumption underlying this approach is that the
intensive margin of trade is governed by the same factors (and in the same way) as the
extensive margin. However, it is not clear theoretically why this should be the case.
For example, in the Melitz (2003) model, the workhorse model of international trade
with heterogeneous firms, the foreign and domestic sales of a firm react proportionally
to changes in the firm’s productivity, conditional on exporting. Hence, while produc-
tivity gains are expected to increase the likelihood of a firm to export, they need not
increase the export intensity of a firm that already exports.31 To address this issue,
we also model the selection into exporting and importing explicitly by using a two-
stage Heckman selection model with skill intensity as an exclusion restriction in the
31 This could help explain why productivity enters insignificantly in the fixed effects specification
above, since changes in the export status over time are rare, while changes in the export intensity of
exporters are frequent.
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first-stage equation.32 The results (not reported) indicate a selection bias for the ex-
port intensity (by a significant coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage
equation), but not for the import intensity. While the effects of a few control vari-
ables on the export intensity (e.g. productivity) change with the selection correction
compared to the SUR model, the year fixed effects hardly change at all.
3.4 Firm competitiveness and crisis resilience
According to our data, in the pre-crisis period 2005-2008, exporting and importing
firms alone were responsible for about 85% of total output, and about 74% of all jobs
in Spanish manufacturing. These numbers are considerably higher in 2012 (92% for
output and 82% for jobs), which attests to a growing importance of the global economy
for the manufacturing sector in Spain. This development is partly explained by new
firms entering foreign markets in recent years, as shown in Section 3.2, but it might
also be the result of an exceptional degree of competitiveness and crisis resilience of
those firms that had already been active on foreign markets before the financial crisis.
Exploring this issue in greater detail is the purpose of this section.
Figure 7 depicts the evolution of various measures of firm performance over the
period 2007-2011 depending on the firm’s export status. We look at four different
firm characteristics that are informative for the analysis of firm behavior in the finan-
cial crisis: real output, effective working hours33, total factor productivity (TFP), and
the (average) hourly wage paid by the firm. Moreover, we distinguish between four
different groups of firms34: continuous exporters (henceforth called exporters), ex-
port market entrants, firms leaving the export market, and continuous non-exporters
(henceforth called non-exporters). To abstract from the effects of entry into and exit
from production (which is analyzed separately below) as well as changes in sample
composition due to nonresponse of firms and refreshment samples, we focus on the
pre-crisis cohort and balance the sample on firms that are observed in each year over
the period considered. All values are normalized to one in 2007.
32 The underlying assumption is that the skill intensity of the firm determines the firm’s trade status
(i.e., the decision to export or import), but does not have a partial effect on the intensity of trade.
33 As explained in Section 2, effective working hours is our preferred measure of employment and
should be interpreted as an input-based indicator of firm size, not as a measure of productivity. All
results reported in this section look almost identical if we use the number of employees (head count)
instead.
34 The precise definition of each group is given in the note to Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Firm competitiveness and crisis resilience, 2007-2011†
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†Note: The sample is balanced on firms that are observed in each year from 2007 to 2011. Continuous
exporters are 671 firms that export in each of the years from 2005 to 2012 (if observed); continuous
non-exporters are 310 firms that do not export in any of the years from 2005 to 2012 (if observed); export
market entrants start exporting in one of the years from 2009 to 2012 and stay in the export market after
entry (43 firms); firms leaving the export market stop exporting in one of the years from 2009 to 2012
and do not re-enter after exit (21 firms). All variables are normalized to one in 2007. Sampling weights
apply. Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESEE data.
There are several insights to be gained from Figure 7. First, firm output and em-
ployment were under strong pressure during the financial crisis and contracted sharply
for all groups of firms. Both exporters and non-exporters reduced their output by
more than 25% from 2007 to 2009. Those firms leaving or entering the export market
reduced their output even more drastically (by more than 35%). The reductions in em-
ployment were smaller than those in output for all groups, ranging from 15% to 30%,
but we observe the same ranking across firms with different export status.
Second, output and employment stabilized after 2009, but this development is fully
attributable to exporters and export market entrants. Non-exporters and firms leaving
the export market, in contrast, continued to shrink further. More generally, it turns
out that a firm’s export status is a good indicator for how well firms did both during
and after the peak of the financial crisis, as exporters outperformed all other firms over
the period 2007-2011. The cumulative differences that we find between exporters and
non-exporters are remarkable. For example, we find that non-exporters produced 38%
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less in 2011 than in 2007, while for exporters the reduction was 18%. Similarly, non-
exporters destroyed 27% of their jobs from 2007 to 2011, whereas for exporters the
same number is 17%.35
Third, the evolution of TFP shows marked differences between exporters and non-
exporters. While from 2007 to 2009 the TFP of both types of firms declined similarly
by about 15%, the trajectory after 2009 correlates strongly with the firm’s export sta-
tus. For exporters, the level of TFP was about the same in 2011 as it was in 2009. For
non-exporters, in contrast, the level of TFP had deteriorated by another 15% in 2011
relative to 2009. Hence, after the financial crisis, non-exporters have lost part of their
technical and managerial efficiency in production (i.e. their ability to transform inputs
into outputs).36 This is a remarkable observation that is likely to shape the dynamics
of the Spanish manufacturing sector over the next couple of years. To gauge the im-
portance of this development for aggregate performance, we have used our firm-level
estimates of TFP to compute changes in industry-level productivity. Aggregate pro-
ductivity is influenced not only by firm-level TFP, but also by the allocation of factors
across firms. Low-productivity firms exiting the market and freeing up resources to be
used by high-productivity firms leads to aggregate productivity gains. We have com-
puted industry-level productivity as the market-share weighted average of firm-level
TFP and found strong heterogeneity in the evolution of aggregate TFP over the period
2005-2012, with some industries experiencing a drastic decline in TFP by more than
65% in response to the financial crisis (such as the industries “computer, electronic
and optical products” or “ferrous and non-ferrous metals”), and very few showing a
positive performance (such as “other transportation equipment”). The overall perfor-
mance at the industry-level was poor: in 18 out of 20 industries TFP declined between
2007 and 2012. While beyond the scope of this paper, analyzing these issues in more
detail might prove fruitful in future research (see Hospido and Moreno-Galbis, 2015,
for a first study in this direction).
Fourth, the (nominal) hourly wage paid by firms increased on average by around
7.5% from 2007 to 2008 and by a compound annual growth rate of about 2.3% there-
after.37 Importantly, although wage moderation efforts are visible during the financial
crisis, real wages continued to increase even after 2007, given a compound annual
35 Not surprisingly, firms leaving the export market in one of the years 2009-2012 performed weakest
in terms of real output and employment throughout the period from 2007 to 2011.
36 One might be tempted to argue that firm-specific input and output price changes are responsible for
this observation. However, firm-level input and output pricing information available in the ESEE
data allow us to demonstrate that this is not the case, as we find hardly any differences in the
evolution of prices between exporters and non-exporters; see Figure A.1 in Appendix A.
37 Due to data limitations we cannot distinguish wages by different types of workers (e.g. high-skilled
vs. low-skilled workers). Hence, the observed wage changes at the firm level may be due to adjust-
ments in both the wages of continuously employed individuals and the composition of employment
(e.g. in terms of skills, types of contracts, or migration background).
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inflation rate of 1.6% over the period 2008-2011.38 Overall, the evolution of wages
is very similar across the four different groups of firms. For exporters, real wages
declined slightly after 2009, making Spanish exports more competitive internationally.
Putting these insights together, we may reflect that the Spanish labor market ad-
justed first and foremost through a contraction in labor demand causing a sharp in-
crease in involuntary unemployment. Owing to the dual nature of the Spanish labor
market (highly protected permanent vs. poorly protected temporary workers),39 this
took the form of massive lay-offs of low-skilled and medium-skilled workers with
temporary contracts, rather than a reduction of the employment intensity of individual
workers.40 The observed development can entail negative effects for future economic
growth, as the skills of unemployed workers erode substantially, especially for longer
unemployment spells.41
A particularly important and fundamental dimension of firm performance is firm
survival. Looking into firm survival in the context of our paper is interesting, because
the challenges posed by a crisis as severe as the one in 2008/09 are more demanding
than the ones associated with the usual business cycle. Figure 8 serves to illustrate
differences in firm survival depending on firms’ export status. The figure follows two
different firm cohorts over a five-year period, and depicts the share of surviving firms in
each cohort (separately for exporters and non-exporters): the first cohort refers to firms
observed in 2003 (Figure 8a) and the second cohort to firms observed in 2007 (Fig-
ure 8b). We define market exit (or, equivalently, firm death) as going out of business or
terminating manufacturing activities (and we exclude firms that ceased to collaborate,
did not respond to the questionnaire, or could not be localized). For simplicity, we
examine only continuous exporters and continuous non-exporters.
Consider first Figure 8b, which follows the 2007 cohort of firms through the cri-
sis period 2007-2011. The figure shows that the share of surviving firms decreases
significantly faster for non-exporters than for exporters throughout this period. Out
of 100 firms that were producing and selling only in the domestic market in 2007,
43 firms had exited the market by 2011. In contrast, out of 100 exporters observed in
2007, only 29 had exited the market over the same period. Hence, those firms entering
38 The inflation data are elicited from consumer price data provided by the OECD at http://stats.oecd.
org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MEI_PRICES.
39 This peculiarity of the Spanish labor market is heavily criticized by leading Spanish economists;
see for instance chapter four in Garicano (2014).
40 The opposite happened in Germany, where the unemployment rate hardly increased at all through
the crisis years. Burda and Hunt (2011) discuss this issue as “the German Labor Market Miracle”.
41 Gregory and Jukes (2001) provide empirical evidence on this mechanism by estimating the effect
of unemployment on earnings following re-employment for British men over the period 1984-1994.
However, one of the conclusions that can be drawn from their analysis is that human capital de-
preciation is lowest for young and low-paid workers and highest for middle-aged and high-paid
workers. This might ameliorate concerns about the future growth of the Spanish economy, as the
crisis caused an increase in unemployment mainly among less experienced and unskilled workers.
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the crisis as exporters (and staying in the export market) had higher chances to survive
the crisis than those starting out as non-exporters. For the sake of comparison, con-
sider next Figure 8a, which conducts the same exercise by following the 2003 cohort
of firms through the pre-crisis period 2003-2007. We find that in this earlier period
survival rates are higher and very similar across exporters and non-exporters. To con-
clude this part of our analysis, we may thus state that exporters were more resilient
than non-exporters to the exceptional economic distress associated with the financial
crisis and the subsequent recession.
Figure 8: Firm survival, before (2003-2007) and during the crisis (2007-2011)†
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†Note: In Figure 8a, the sample is restricted to the 2003 cohort of firms; continuous exporters are 714
firms that export in each of the years from 2001 to 2008 (if observed); continuous non-exporters are 341
firms that do not export in any of the years from 2001 to 2008 (if observed). In Figure 8b, the sample is
restricted to the 2007 cohort of firms; continuous exporters are 949 firms that export in each of the years
from 2005 to 2012 (if observed); continuous non-exporters are 544 firms that do not export in any of the
years from 2005 to 2012 (if observed). Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESEE data.
We next address the issue of performance differences between exporters and non-
exporters in a more rigorous way by using econometric methods. It is a well-known
fact that exporters have a competitive edge over non-exporters. Bernard and Jensen
(1999) and others have shown that exporters are on average more productive than non-
exporters, have higher sales, and employ more workers. These differences have been
quantified in terms of so-called exporter premia. We estimate time-varying exporter
premia for several measures of firm performance and document the evolution of these
premia during the financial crisis and subsequent global recession. We also identify
(and quantify) the advantage of exporters regarding the likelihood to survive the crisis.
Building on the methodology established in the literature, we estimate variants of
the following econometric model:
Performanceit =  t · Exporterit + ✓ · Zit +  t +  ks + "it, (7)
where Performanceit is one of the following four variables: real output (total produc-
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tion value, in logs), effective working hours (in logs), TFP (in logs), and survival (as
a dummy variable indicating that the firm is still active and producing in the follow-
ing year). As above, the variable Exporterit is a dummy variable for positive exports,
 t represents the coefficients of interest (with t = 05, . . . , 12),  t is a year fixed ef-
fect,  ks is an industry-size-group fixed effect, and "it is the error term. The vector
Zit collects a number of firm-specific and time-varying control variables, and the vec-
tor ✓ includes the corresponding parameters to be estimated. This setup allows us to
estimate the evolution of conditional performance differences between exporters and
non-exporters, as we control for the industry-size-group combination corresponding
to the firm, as well as a common set of firm-level characteristics (identical to those
used in the previous section, but excluding the performance variables themselves). We
estimate Equation (7) by OLS without firm fixed effects, which allows us to identify
the levels of different exporter premia as well as their evolution over time.
Figure 9 displays our estimates of the year-specific exporter premia  ˆt for the dif-
ferent performance variables. In terms of output, employment, and productivity, our
results demonstrate that exporters were outperforming non-exporters throughout the
period of analysis. Furthermore, these differences have been increasing over time, in
particular in the years 2011 and 2012, so exporters magnified their size and produc-
tivity advantages after the financial crisis. More precisely, in 2007, exporters were on
average 22% larger in terms of output and 6% larger in terms of employment com-
pared to non-exporters. These differences had widened to more than 50% for output
and 15% for employment by 2012. Similarly, exporters increased their TFP premium
from 5% to 13% between 2007 and 2012.
Two comments on these results are in order. First, the estimated exporter premia
accord well with the evolution of real output, employment, and TFP depicted in Fig-
ure 7. As the performance of exporters was less detrimentally affected by the crisis
than the performance of non-exporters, the performance premia of exporters conse-
quently increased over the crisis period. Second, the levels of, and the changes in, the
estimated exporter premia are arguably determined by a host of different factors.42 An
investigation into these factors is beyond the scope of our analysis. In a similar vein,
while our estimates show significant and increasing performance differences between
exporters and non-exporters and thus point to extra benefits of exporting in times of
crisis, we must emphasize that our regressions do not allow for a causal interpretation.
It seems at least conceivable that exporting firms fared better during the crisis than
non-exporting firms due to factors that gained in importance in the crisis but are not
42 The usual explanation for observing positive exporter premia is that success leads to exporting
(based on the idea that only the ‘good’ and successful firms are able to cover the additional costs
associated with exporting) or that exporting leads to success (due to technology or knowledge
spillovers and learning by exporting). These explanations are of course not mutually exclusive.
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directly related to exporting (such as superior management quality or a more flexible
and efficient labor force). A rigorous analysis of these different factors and the ques-
tion of whether exporting was causally associated with a stronger performance in the
crisis is left for future research.
As for the estimated exporter premium for firm survival in Figure 9, we find that it
is positive throughout, but small and insignificant in the pre-crisis period. It is signif-
icantly positive for the first time in 2008, where it reaches its peak of 3.2 percentage
points. This estimate suggests that exporters were more likely than non-exporters to
survive the peak of the crisis and still be producing in 2009. In the subsequent years,
the survival premium remains above the pre-crisis level, but is only significantly dif-
ferent from zero in 2011. Again, this finding is in line with the analysis in Figure 8
and suggests that exporting was beneficial for firm survival in the crisis.
Figure 9: Exporter premia, 2005-2012†
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†Note: The figure shows estimates of  t in Equation (7) for t = 05, . . . , 12, alongside 95% confidence
intervals. These estimates can be interpreted as year-specific exporter premia for the variables indicated
in the subfigures. For output, effective working hours, and TFP, the exporter premia are given in percent-
ages. For survival, the premium is given in percentage points. The estimated premia are conditional on
the share of foreign capital in the firm’s joint capital (0%; > 0% &  50%; > 50%), the firm’s cap-
ital intensity, R&D intensity, skill intensity, type of good produced (intermediate good; final good; not
defined), multinational status, as well as the industry-and-size-group cluster to which the firm belongs.
Confidence intervals derive from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Source: Authors’
estimations based on ESEE data.
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Is the fact that exporters were so much more resilient to the crisis than non-
exporters special to the case of Spain, or do we observe a similar pattern in other
European countries too? To answer this question, we exploit direct questions on firms’
export status and their crisis performance in the EFIGE data set. As indicators of cri-
sis performance, we compute the shares of firms (by country and export status) that
reduced their sales, employment, and exports by at least 30% in 2009 compared to
2008.43
Figure 10: Firms’ crisis performance across European countries†
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†Note: This figure reports the share of firms (by country and export status, in percent) that reduced their
sales, employment, and exports by more than 30% in 2009 (compared to 2008). The number of firms
reporting changes in sales are 2,832 for Spain, 2,973 for France, 2,929 for Germany, 3,021 for Italy,
439 for Austria, 488 for Hungary, and 2,046 for the UK. The number of firms for all other variables are
slightly smaller. Sampling weights apply. Source: Authors’ calculations based on EFIGE data.
Figure 10 suggests that Spain is indeed a special case, at least in two dimensions.
First, we see that, whether we look at exporters or non-exporters, firms in Spain were
hit the hardest by the crisis in terms of overall performance.44 The share of firms that
drastically reduced their sales and their employment was larger in Spain than in any
43 The results are qualitatively similar when examining the shares of firms that experienced any reduc-
tion at all instead of applying the 30% threshold.
44 Due to data limitations, the export status refers to the year 2008 instead of 2009, but it is highly per-
sistent in the EFIGE sample. More than 97% of exporters, but virtually none of the non-exporters,
had exported before 2008 (as reported by firms in the data set).
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other country covered by the EFIGE data. For example, one fifth of all non-exporting
firms in Spain shed more than 30% of their labor in 2009, more than twice the share
observed in any other country in our sample.
The second insight from Figure 10 is that the superior crisis performance of ex-
porters over non-exporters seems to be the exception rather than the rule in Europe.
Not only do the EFIGE data confirm our previous findings that in Spain it was the
non-exporting firms that suffered the most in 2009; the data also show that it is only in
Spain that a significantly larger share of non-exporters than of exporters saw their sales
plummet. The same holds true for the strong reductions in employment (with Italy be-
ing the only exception and showing a pattern similar to Spain, although on a much
lower level). It would be interesting to investigate these cross-country differences (and
the underlying causes) in more detail in future work.
We finally notice that in terms of export reductions Spain ranks in the middle of
the seven-country sample. This is perhaps surprising in light of the strong relative ex-
port performance described in the introduction and depicted in Figure 1. A possible
explanation may be that in Spain it is very few very successful firms that are respon-
sible for the increase in exports over the last couple of years (as suggested by Antràs,
2011). Moreover, one should keep in mind that in Figure 10 we only look at changes
between 2008 and 2009, whereas Figure 1 describes the evolution of exports over the
entire period 2007-2013.
4 Discussion
4.1 Improved aggregate competitiveness
The analysis provided in this paper is a micro-level analysis emphasizing the role of
firm heterogeneity in international trade during the crisis years. Yet, the economic and
political discussions surrounding the recent performance of the Spanish economy are
often couched in terms of what is vaguely referred to as “international competitive-
ness” or “aggregate competitiveness”. Can recent improvements in competitiveness
explain the exceptionally strong export performance of the Spanish economy? We
now provide a brief look into relevant data that allow us to give a tentative answer to
this question. At this point it proves useful to recall some insights of standard macroe-
conomic theory. The key assumption is some nominal imperfection in the short run
(e.g. price stickiness), such that the real wage does not instantaneously adjust to fluc-
tuations in aggregate demand. This implies that the short-run aggregate supply curve
is not vertical, so that a negative shock to aggregate consumption or investment leads
to lower output and involuntary unemployment. For a country like Spain, which is
well integrated into the global economy, international trade can provide a remedy for
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such a negative demand shock. This can happen through a nominal depreciation of the
Euro vis-à-vis other currencies (over the short and medium run), as well as through
differential price changes that improve the Spanish terms of trade within the Eurozone
(over the medium and long run). We find evidence that both channels are likely to have
played a significant role in the favorable development of Spanish exports.
As for the first channel, nominal exchange rate depreciation, we examine the two
most important non-Eurozone destinations for Spanish exports: the United Kingdom
(the fifth largest importer of Spanish goods in 2013) and the United States (the sixth
largest importer).45 When we look at the relevant period from January 1, 2009, to
December 31st, 2013, the Euro depreciated relative to both the Pound sterling and
the US dollar (in each case by 5% when comparing yearly averages). As a result,
Spanish products became less expensive in the UK and the US, whereas imports from
these two countries became more expensive for Spain. This development seems to
be reflected in the trade data: from 2009 to 2013, total Spanish exports to the UK
and the US increased by a remarkable 55%, whereas total imports increased by just
9%. In contrast, when considering the Eurozone countries among the top six export
destinations (France, Germany, Portugal, and Italy), for which nominal depreciation
did not play any role, total Spanish exports increased by much less (viz. by 24%),
while imports increased at a similar rate (viz. by 7%).
To offer a more systematic view of the issue, we examine the evolution of nominal
effective exchange rates for Spain. Nominal effective exchange rates are weighted av-
erages of the usual bilateral nominal exchange rates, where the weights reflect the im-
portance of trading partners in terms of their volume of international trade with Spain
(considering only trade in manufacturing goods). It turns out that, irrespective of the
details of the weighting scheme applied, we observe a depreciation of Spain’s nominal
effective exchange rate (EER) over the period 2009-2013, and thus a corresponding
improvement of its competitive position. For example, for the ECB EER-38 group of
currencies plus the latest composition of the Eurozone, the index for Spain’s nominal
effective exchange rate decreased from 107.5 in 2009 to 104.8 in 2013 (having normal-
ized the index to 100 in 1999).46 This observation corroborates the presumption that
nominal depreciation has contributed to boosting Spanish exports, while it has made
imports from outside the Eurozone more expensive (on average).
45 All data mentioned in this paragraph are readily accessible through the website of INE.
46 The depreciation is not monotonic over the period considered and has its minimum in 2012 at
102.6. The countries in the ECB EER-38 group of currencies are the non-Eurozone EU member
states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom), plus Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Hong Kong,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Russia, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the
United States, and Venezuela. All data on nominal and real exchange rates come from the Statistical
Data Warehouse of the ECB: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/.
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As for the second channel, differential price changes may improve the competitive
position of Spain even within the Eurozone, where nominal exchange rates are fixed
at unity. Since the drop in aggregate demand was stronger in Spain than in most other
Eurozone countries (see Figure 10 for supporting evidence), we should see a change in
real exchange rates improving Spain’s competitive position vis-à-vis other Eurozone
countries (especially those that quickly returned to economic growth after the financial
crisis). To investigate this possibility, we first examine real effective exchange rates
(REER) based on the ECB’s harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP). We find
that the HICP-based index for Spain’s REER vis-à-vis the latest composition of the Eu-
rozone plus the ECB EER-12 group of currencies decreased only slightly from 114.8
in 2009 to 113.6 in 2013.47 Moreover, a similar or even more pronounced decrease
in this index is observed for many other Eurozone countries as well (e.g. Germany,
France, Greece, and Italy). Hence, differences in the development of consumer prices
within the Eurozone are not a relevant channel when it comes to explaining the recent
export performance of Spain.
One issue with the HICP-based REER is that the evolution of consumer prices
might not accurately reflect changes in a country’s competitive position in interna-
tional trade. The reason is that a significant share of consumption expenditure is on
non-tradable goods and services, while many tradable goods are not included in the
consumption basket (e.g. capital goods). Hence, an important alternative to looking at
consumer prices is to focus on unit labor costs. It turns out that for Spain this distinc-
tion is extremely important. In particular, the index for Spain’s REER based on unit
labor costs (but otherwise defined as above) decreased from 119.5 in 2009 to 105.8
in 2013, while it basically stagnated for Germany, Italy, and France. Only Greece,
arguably the Eurozone country that experienced the most adverse shock to aggregate
demand, showed a development comparable to that of Spain. Hence, Spain has be-
come more competitive internationally through internal devaluation (i.e., real wages
growing less than productivity relative to other Eurozone countries).
One way to summarize this discussion is to look at the evolution of relative unit
labor costs, a broad competitiveness measure that reflects both nominal exchange rate
depreciation and internal devaluation at the same time. Figure 11 shows that, unlike
other countries such as Germany, Italy, France, the UK, or the US, Spain has experi-
enced a steady decline in relative unit labor costs since 2008. The decrease in relative
unit labor costs was particularly pronounced in 2012, the year for which we have es-
timated the strongest conditional difference in both export participation and export
intensity compared to the pre-crisis period (see Tables 2 and 3). Interestingly, the
47 The countries in the ECB EER-12 group of currencies are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong,
Japan, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
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development since 2008 is in stark contrast to the one before 2008. Antràs (2011) de-
scribes how exports from Spain fared surprisingly well in spite of deteriorating com-
petitiveness observed prior to the crisis. Hence, the evolution of relative unit labor
costs may play a role in explaining the strong export performance of Spain in the years
after 2008, while it is more difficult to reconcile with the export performance over the
previous decade. It should be noted, however, that the largest firms in Spain experi-
enced a more favorable development of unit labor costs than many of their European
competitors already before 2008 (as pointed out by Antràs, 2011).48 Because the large
firms are responsible for the lion’s share of a country’s exports, it seems plausible that
this development had a positive impact on aggregate exports also before 2008.
Figure 11: Relative unit labor costs, 2007-2014†
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It emerges from our micro-level analysis that the factors underlying the observed
increase in aggregate competitiveness in Spain are unrelated to technological improve-
ments or a more efficient resource allocation, as a large majority of manufacturing in-
dustries in Spain experienced a decrease in aggregate TFP (as demonstrated above).
Rather, the enhanced competitiveness of Spain seems closely linked to the country’s
problematic labor market performance. Record unemployment rates around 25% in
48 In a similar vein, Antràs (2011) argues that in terms of productivity the largest firms in Spain out-
perform not only their domestic peers, but also their European competitors.
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2012 and 2013 put downward pressure on real wages.49 In the face of downward
nominal wage rigidity and overall low inflation rates, however, it is to a significant ex-
tent the increase in real wages in some of Spain’s most important trading partners that
boosted Spain’s competitive position. For example, real wages in Germany increased
by 3.6% (while unemployment decreased) over the period 2010-2013. This is by far
the largest increase the country has experienced over any three-year period in the re-
cent past.50 Exports from Spain have thus clearly benefited from the cross-country
differences in labor market adjustments within Europe.
An interesting implication of our analysis in Section 3.4 is that exporting firms
contributed the most to enhanced aggregate competitiveness in terms of relative unit
labor costs. These firms increased their output after 2009, while at the same time
reducing both their employment and their real wages. While our data show that this
development is not driven by technological improvements within the firm,51 it is in
sharp contrast to non-exporting firms, which continued to reduce their output and saw
their productivity decline even after the financial crisis.
4.2 Substituting domestic with foreign sales
Another explanation for the strong export performance of Spain that we want to dis-
cuss in some detail is directly tied to the fact that aggregate demand was more strongly
adversely affected in Spain than in many other countries in the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis and through the subsequent years.52 As mentioned in the introduction, Spain
went through a double-dip recession in 2009 and 2011-13. The findings of our micro-
data analysis, in particular the observations that more firms entered the export market
after the financial crisis, while existing exporters increased their share of exports in
total sales, suggest that firms in Spain substituted domestic with foreign sales.
Under which conditions can we expect firms to treat domestic and foreign sales
as substitutes? Not necessarily under the conditions of standard trade theory (e.g.
Melitz, 2003), where firms maximize profits in the domestic and the export market
independently of one another. Moreover, failure in one market might actually trigger
failure in the other market, for example when liquidity constraints take hold (as sales
in the domestic market might generate the extra liquidity necessary to generate sales in
the foreign market). However, two recent papers construct theoretical models that help
rationalize a substitutive rather than complementary relationship between domestic
49 See Eurostat data available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database.
50 See the (real) wage data available from the OECD at http://stats.oecd.org/.
51 As shown in Figure 7, exporting firms had about the same level of TFP in 2009 as in 2011.
52 For example, GDP data from INE as well as the data depicted in Figure 10 suggest that the drop
in aggregate demand in 2009-2012 was more dramatic in Spain than in most of its major trading
partners.
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and foreign sales. Both papers are based on the assumption of production costs being
convex in the short run; we briefly discuss both of these papers in turn and argue that
they are likely to be relevant in the Spanish case.
A first explanation is advanced by Vannoorenberghe (2012). In his model with
labor as the only factor of production, firms face increasing marginal costs of pro-
duction in the short run, as it becomes increasingly expensive for the firm to employ
more labor. This implies a negative correlation between foreign and domestic sales
within the firm, and a negative domestic demand shock will induce the firm to sell
larger quantities on the export market in the short run. The overall rigidity and dual
nature of the Spanish labor market, granting high job protection to permanent em-
ployees, makes such cost convexities very likely, as they might rule out the first-best
response of firms to demand shocks (in terms of adjusting the labor input). Hence, the
theory by Vannoorenberghe (2012) might partly explain the significant increase in the
export intensity of incumbent exporters over the crisis period that we have identified
in Table 3.
Can a slump in domestic demand also trigger the entry of new firms into the export
market that we observe in Spain after 2009? Focusing on the extensive margin, Blum
et al. (2013) set up a Melitz (2003) model in which firms face capacity constraints
due to investments in fixed capital ex ante (i.e., before demand shocks in the domestic
and the export market are known to the firm).53 This assumption again implies convex
production costs in the short run. In response to an adverse shock to domestic demand,
their model predicts not only a shift of sales to the foreign market within exporters (as
in Vannoorenberghe, 2012), but also export market entry of firms that were previously
confined to the domestic market. The intuition for this prediction is that if capacity is
utilized below a certain threshold, it is optimal for the firm to bear the cost of export-
ing. For some firms, exporting then essentially serves as a means to survive the shock.
Extreme changes in domestic demand, like the deep recession in Spain, can thus push
more firms into the export market in the short run. This intuition is also in line with
the findings by Belke et al. (2015), who provide empirical support for a substitutive
relationship between domestic and foreign sales in their analysis of macro data for sev-
eral Eurozone countries. The evidence is particularly strong for the southern European
countries Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
53 See Soderbery (2014) for a model that yields similar predictions based on linear demand and capac-
ity constraints.
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Figure 12: Capacity utilization, 2007-2011†
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Figure 12 demonstrates that our micro data are consistent with an explanation
based on capacity constraints and hence convex production costs in the short run. It de-
picts the evolution of average capacity utilization by groups of firms defined according
to their export status (in analogy to Figure 7). From 2007 to 2009, capacity utilization
dropped from above 82% to below 73% for all groups of firms. A reduction of this size
seems large enough to trigger the above-mentioned adjustments. Of particular interest
is the heterogeneity in this drop and the development during the later years. On the
one hand, for continuous non-exporters, capacity utilization continued to decline after
2009, giving rise to an accumulated loss of 17 percentage points (20%) for the period
from 2007 to 2011.54 For continuous and new exporters, on the other hand, capacity
utilization not only declined by less from 2007 to 2009, but it also increased again
after 2009. Interestingly, export market entrants show the most favorable development
over the observed period, which suggests that starting to export indeed helped these
firms to exploit otherwise unused (and costly) capacities. Taken together, the available
evidence suggests that cost convexities might have contributed to the fact that firms
54 Firms leaving the export market experienced an even larger decline of 20 percentage points (25%).
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rely more on exports today than before the financial crisis, as we have documented in
our main analysis.
5 Conclusion
We have explored a rich firm-level data set from Spain to provide novel evidence on
firm behavior during and after the 2008 financial crisis. We have investigated changes
at the extensive and intensive firm-level margins of trade, as well as performance dif-
ferences (jobs, productivity, and firm survival) between exporting and non-exporting
firms. We find that the trade collapse in 2009 is almost fully explained by adjustments
at the intensive margin. The number of firms that were forced to exit the export mar-
ket due to the crisis is negligible, and firms allocated a larger fraction of their sales
to foreign markets, especially in the years after 2010. Moreover, we find a growing
performance gap between exporters and non-exporters, which shows that exporters
proved to be more resilient to the economic challenges they were facing during the
global financial crisis and subsequent recession. Exporters now account for a larger
share of output and jobs, and they contribute more to aggregate productivity than be-
fore the financial crisis. However, we observe a decline in the aggregate productivity
of the manufacturing sector as a whole over the crisis period. These findings are of
direct relevance for the ongoing political debate about the current and future economic
situation in Spain.
We conclude by pointing out some interesting similarities between the current situ-
ation in Spain and the situation observed more than a decade ago in Germany.55 From
the mid-1990s and into the 2000s, Germany suffered from high unemployment and
poor economic growth. However, relative unit labor costs had set out to decrease in
1995, boosting German exports through a gradual improvement of the country’s com-
petitive position in the global economy. The same seems to be currently happening
in Spain. At the time of the financial crisis, Germany had already been the world
champion of exports for several years, economic growth had returned, and unemploy-
ment had been brought down. Germany had transformed itself from the “sick man of
Europe” into an “economic superstar” (Dustmann et al., 2014).
A compelling narrative behind this development, advanced by Dustmann et al.
(2014), is that German labor market institutions were flexible enough to allow for a
significant decentralization of the wage-setting process, away from the industry level
towards the firm level. This decentralization, largely triggered by the fall of the iron
curtain and the pressures of economic globalization, translated into a considerable
decline in real wages at the lower end of the wage distribution, and ultimately to a
55 See also the article “Spain’s economy: Not yet the new Germany,” published on March 9th, 2013,
by The Economist.
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more competitive economy. It was one of the principal aims of the 2012 labor market
reform in Spain to widen the scope of collective bargaining at the firm level (OECD,
2014). Future research will need to showwhether this reform can contribute to a better-
functioning labor market that can mimic the German success and further enhance the
international competitiveness of Spanish exports.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Exporter dummy 15,074 0.641 0.48 0.000 1.000
Importer dummy 15,051 0.63 0.483 0.000 1.000
Export value (1,000 EUR in prices of 2010) 15,074 26,270 205,000 0 7,731,165
Domestic sales (1,000 EUR in prices of 2010) 15,074 39,065 167,334 0 6,058,877
Import value (1,000 EUR in prices of 2010) 15,051 16,417 124,840 0 3,780,449
Domestic purchases (1,000 EUR in prices of 2010) 15,048 35,744 179,316 0 5,463,883
Market exit 12,433 0.033 0.179 0.000 1.000
Multinational dummy 15,074 0.090 0.286 0.000 1.000
Foreign ownership: =0% 15,060 0.846 0.361 0.000 1.000
Foreign ownership: >0% & <=50% 15,060 0.021 0.142 0.000 1.000
Foreign ownership: >50% 15,060 0.133 0.340 0.000 1.000
Labor productivity (in logs) 14,935 12.268 1.696 2.785 19.16
Capital intensity (in logs) 15,043 4.357 1.140 -2.303 9.013
R&D intensity (in logs) 15,042 0.008 0.032 0.000 2.636
Skill intensity (in logs) 14,629 0.192 0.253 0.000 2.760
Type of good: final good 14,743 0.162 0.368 0.000 1.000
Type of good: intermediate good 14,743 0.264 0.441 0.000 1.000
Type of good: not defined 14,743 0.574 0.494 0.000 1.000
TFP (in logs) 14,914 -0.105 1.371 -4.947 5.555
Real output (in logs) 15,074 15.887 1.969 9.921 22.765
Effective working hours (in logs) 15,051 11.563 1.416 7.496 17.029
Hourly wage (in logs) 14,996 2.853 0.406 0.397 4.825
Internet dummy 15,060 0.774 0.418 0.000 1.000
I
Figure A.1: Evolution of firm-level output and input prices, 2007-2011†
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